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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CATE RENTAL COMPANY, INC. 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
WHALEN & COMPANY, 
Defendant-Respondent 
Case No. 14292 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit by plaintiff for breach of a 
rental agreement between plaintiff and defendant and 
for damages resulting from defendant's negligent opera-
tion of plaintiff's rental equipment* 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The district judge granted an Order of Dis-
missal in favor of defendant on the grounds that defen-
dant is a foreign corporation and had not transacted 
business within Utah so as to be subject to the juris-
diction of the Utah courts under § 78-27-24 U.C.A.
 t 
(1969). 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the 
Order of Dismissal below on the grounds that the defen-
dant has transacted business within the State of Utah 
and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts 
under § 78-27-24 U.C.A. (1969). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are essentially uncon-
troverted. Plaintiff transacted business with defendant 
on a continuous basis for more than ten years prior to 
the transaction at issue in the instant case. The busi-
ness transacted between the parties involved the purchase 
or lease of various mining and construction equipment 
for which defendant paid plaintiff many thousands of 
dollars. Defendant through its president, Jerry Whalen, 
contacted plaintiff's sales representatives in regard to 
the purchase or lease of miscellaneous mining and con-
struction equipment on the average of five times a year. 
Plaintiff would accept defendant's offers to purchase 
or lease certain equipment, and would thereupon ship 
the equipment FOB its offices in Salt Lake City, Utah to 
the location designated by defendant. Plaintiff would 
thereafter send an invoice to defendant's office con-
firming the transaction and defendant would send to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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plaintiff the balances due on the o MI I i aef , Whale tho°p 
transactions were liu Mir most, part conducted by phono 
, v Atfialen met with plaintiff's sa1ec * \, 
Thomas McKean, ?A -iaintiff's nffioe,- in j-.jj.i Lak- ./ity 
in 1973, in J to negotiations between Whalen & 
Company and Gate? Equipment concerning I ho business 
dealings. 
I :ransacH nr o :i ct .* *M -\i-. 
entered l * * br telephone * • > , ordering 
for lease - » ., .. ,,..-• included , ourchase 
.,*;;; ' * » , t , <" f >rc * * * 
and r +he i r • - . - J shipped 
r
 e c T • , <-• defendant * s instructions, to a 
; ite i •viC),:!.»i:i . s transaction \:<\t i epical of 
r *.« many ot^r - ,
 us centered into by defendant 
wjrli | J ,j j m itl between 19fS2 and 1973. • •' :' " . • -
ARGUMENT 
Defendant" II,is t r a n s a c t e d b u s i n e s s in t h e S t a t e 
of llldli so -if; ti* be w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n ' T'f.ih c o u ^ e 
u n d e r U t a h ' s s o - c a l l e d Lo iu -\H'I .I-"1 t l u t e . • ' ; 
Tin out pose uf (he s o - c a l l e d Long-Arm S t ; 
"I "be S t a t e of Utah I s e x p r e s s e d i n 7«< ',' , ,Y U.C.A. (1969) 
a s f o l l o w s : 
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It is declared, as a matter of legislative 
determination, that the public interest 
demands the state provide its citizens with 
an effective means of redress against non-
resident persons, who through certain signi-
ficant minimal contacts with this state, 
incur obligations to citizens entitled to 
the state's protection. This legislative 
action is deemed necessary because of 
technological progress which has substan-
tially increased the flow of commerce be-
tween the several states resulting in 
increased interaction between persons 
of this state and persons of other states. 
The provisions of this act, to ensure 
maximum protection to citizens of this 
state, should be applied so as to assert 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants 
to the fullest extent permitted by the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. 
This section clearly demonstrates the Utah Legislature's 
determination that resident plaintiffs are to be afforded 
effective redress against nonresidents in Utah courts so 
long as vesting jurisdiction does not violate due process. 
The issue then in this case is whether defendant engaged 
in any "transaction of business within this state," 
§ 78-27-24(1) such that maintenance of jurisdiction "does 
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
Since Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), 
there has been a clear trend to expand state court juris-
diction over nonresidents. In International Shoe Co. v. 
-4-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Supreme Court 
established the minimum contacts rule for the basis of 
state jurisdiction, to the extent "that the maintenance 
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.1" 326 U.S. at 316. 
Subsequently, the Court in McGee v. International Life 
Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), seemingly eliminated 
most limitations upon state court jurisdiction in hold-
ing that California had jurisdiction over a foreign 
insurance company whose sole contact with the state was 
a single life insurance contract upon the life of plain-
tiff's decedent. The following year in Hanson v. Denckla, 
357 U.S. 235 (1958) the Court, however, reaffirmed the 
necessity of minimum contacts in declaring, "it is essen-
tial in each case that there be some act by which the 
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum state . . . " 357 
U.S. at 253. 
These Supreme Court cases discuss three rele-
vant criteria for determining the constitutional outer-
limits of in personam jurisdiction: 
First, the defendant must purposefully 
avail himself of the privilege of acting 
in the forum state or causing a conse-
quence in the forum state. Second, the 
cause of action must arise from the 
defendant's activities there. Finally, 
-5-
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the acts of the defendant or consequences 
caused by the defendant must have a sub-
stantial enough connection with the forum 
state to make the exercise of jurisdiction 
over the defendant reasonable. Southern 
Machine Company v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 
401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968). 
For a similar approach to the problem of in personam 
jurisdiction, See, L. D. Reeder Contractors of Arizona 
v. Higgins Industries, 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959); 
Aftanese v. Economy Baler Company, 343 F.2d 187 (8th 
Cir. 1965)? Curtis Publishing Company v. T. B. Birdsong, 
360 F.2d 344, 352-353 (5th Cir. 1966) (Rives, J. con-
curring) ; Hill v. Smith, 337 F.Supp 981 (W. D. Mich. 
1972); Tyee Construction Co. v. Dulien Steel Products, 
Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963). In instances 
where those three criteria are satisfied, in personam 
jurisdiction may be constitutionally recognized even 
on the basis of a single act. Applying these criteria 
to the instant case, the District Court erred in dis-
missing the Complaint based upon lack of jurisdiction. 
A. 
THE DEFENDANT PURPOSEFULLY AVAILED 
ITSELF OF THE PRIVILEGE OF ACTING 
OR CAUSING CONSEQUENCE IN THE FORUM 
STATE. 
1. Defendant's physical presence is not a con-
stitutional requirement for recognizing jurisdiction where 
defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege 
of acting or causing consequence in the forum state. 
-6-
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In support of its motion to dismiss, defendant 
asserts that it has no office or place of business, 
directory listing, warehouse or inventory in the State 
of Utah, that it owns no real or personal property in the 
State of Utah, that it does not maintain any subsidiary, 
employee, salesman, agent, distributorship, or representa-
tive in the State of Utah and that it never came into the 
State of Utah in connection with the contract at issue 
in this case. 
While it is not disputed that physical presence 
as evidenced by any of the above-mentioned circumstances 
are important indicia of significant contacts justifying 
the recognition of jurisdiction, such presence is not 
necessary nor conclusive of the issue of whether or not 
recognizing jurisdiction would violate due process. 
Although such factors of actual physical presence are 
important, nearly every jurisdiction has changed the 
focus, in at least those instances involving commercial 
dealings, and consider whether or not the defendant is 
present in a business rather than necessarily a physical 
sense. In McGraw v. Matthaei, 340 F.Supp. 162 (E.D. 
Mich. 1972), for example, the court criticized defendant's 
reliance on the fact that he was never physically present 
in the state. 
-7-
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Defendant has placed great emphasis on 
the fact that he was not physically 
present in the state when he executed 
the note. This court is of the opinion 
that one need not be physically present 
in the state to "transact business with-
in the state," 
Modern technology has taken us far beyond 
the point where two men must stand in 
each other's physical presence to trans-
act business. Widespread use of the tele-
phone and the mails make actual physical 
presence unnecessary in many cases . . . . 
For all practical purposes transactions 
accomplished with such devices have the 
same effect as if the two men had been in 
each other's physical presence. 340 F.Supp at 164. 
To the same effect, the court in O'Hare International 
437 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1971) held that personal juris-
diction does not require the physical presence of the 
defendant within the state: 
/personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant does not depend upon the physical 
presence of the defendant within the state. 
It is sufficient that the act or trans-
action itself has a substantial connection 
with the forum state. 437 F.2d at 1175. 
The test then that has replaced actual presence 
in the state is whether the party has purposefully trans-
acted business having substantial consequences within 
the forum. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the 
"purposeful activity" requirement, as compared to stress-
ing factors of physical presence, in a number of cases. 
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In Mack Financial Corporation v. Nevada Motor Rentals, 
Inc., Utah 2d , 529 P.2d 429 (1974), 
for example, defendant's trucks, purchased pursuant to 
a conditional sales contract from plaintiff's assignor, 
were driven over Utah highways, and, therefore, defen-
dant was physically present within the forum. The con-
tracts and assignments incident to the sales in that 
case, however, had been executed in Colorado and the 
defendant had not purposefully transacted business with-
in the forum. Consequently, the court held that Utah 
courts had no jurisdiction over defendant. Similarly, 
in Pellegrini v. Sachs and Sons, Utah 2d , 
522 P.2d 704 (1974) the court discussed the purposeful 
activity requirement of Hanson v. Denckla, supra, as the 
critical jurisdictional issue. There plaintiff brought 
a product's liability action against a California auto-
mobile dealer and Ford Motor Company for damages arising 
out of breach of warranty. In concluding that the Utah 
courts had no jurisdiction over the California dealer 
who had sold the automobile to plaintiff but who had not 
purposefully transacted business within the State of Utah, 
the court asserted that, 
Plaintiff must nevertheless show that 
the defendant, by himself or agent, 
engaged in some substantial activity 
which constitutes a purposeful minimum 
contact with this state upon which to 
predicate jurisdiction of our courts. 
522 P.2d at 708. 
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Again in Transwestern General Agency v. Morgan, 
Utah 2d
 # 526 P.2d 1186 (1974) the court held 
that the defendant did not purposefully engage in busi-
ness in Utah where he merely procured an insurance 
policy from a Utah corporation through an agent in 
Idaho. Finally, the court in Hanks v. Administrator 
of the Estate of Jensen, Utah 2d _f 
531 P.2d 363 (1974) held that the Utah courts had no 
jurisdiction where defendant had not purposefully trans-
acted business within the state, but only had been 
appointed as Administrator of an estate: 
The rationale of statutes and the 
decisional law in the trend toward 
extending jurisdiction over foreign 
residents is that there must be some 
intentional and purposeful activity of 
the defendant in the forum state by 
which he takes advantage of the benefits 
and protections of its laws, and is 
obliged reciprocally to submit to its 
remedies. 531 P.2d at 364. 
In comparison, where the nonresident defendant 
has purposefully acted within the state, the Utah Supreme 
Court has recognized jurisdiction. In Hill v. Zale, 
25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P.2d 332 (1971) the court asserted 
that where a nonresident corporation has enjoyed the 
benefits of having purposefully carried on business 
within the state, jurisdiction is proper: 
-10-
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When a foreign corporation is permitted 
to enjoy the advantages of having activi-
ties carried on within a state to further 
its business interests under the protec-
tion of its laws, it is only fair and 
reasonable that its citizens have some 
practical means of redress if grievances 
arise. jEd. at 334. 
The Court followed a similar line of reasoning in 
Foreign Study League v. Holland-America Line, 27 Utah 2d 
447, 497 P.2d 244 (1972). There defendant's purposeful 
activities within the forum included sales and sales 
promotion within the state by "independent nonexclusive 
sales representatives" together with two visits to Utah 
by defendant's agents. This purposeful activity was 
held by the court to satisfy constitutional standards 
notwithstanding the fact that the defendant had no 
stores or offices in Utah, as well as no employees or 
personnel in Utah. lei. at 249 (Crockett, J. dissenting ).. 
In conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court has 
consistently applied the Mpurposeful activity" approach 
in analyzing jurisdiction. In those cases where the 
nonresident defendant has not purposefully transacted 
business within the state, the court has refused juris-
diction; even in those instances where defendant had 
been physically present in the state. On the other hand 
where the nonresident defendant has purposefully trans-
acted business within the state, the court has recognized 
-11-
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jurisdiction on the basis of that business presence, 
notwithstanding the fact that the defendants actual 
physical presence may be limited to a few visits to 
Utah for combined "business and social" purposes. 
In support of its position, defendant asserts 
that while it purposefully transacted business having 
substantial consequence within the forum, its actual 
contacts were either by phone or mail. 
A contract entered into by phone or mail is 
recognized as sufficient "presence" to justify vesting 
jurisdiction: 
It is important to emphasize that one 
need not be physically present in order 
to be subject to the jurisdiction of our 
courts under /the Forum's Long-Arm 
Statute/ for, particularly in this day 
of instant long-range communications, 
one can engage in extensive purposeful 
activity here without ever actually 
setting foot in the state . . . . Any 
implication, in older cases, that physi-
cal presence was a necessary factor in 
obtaining jurisdiction over nonresidents 
was expressly rejected by the Supreme 
Court in the International Shoe case . . . . 
The terms "present" and "presence" are 
used merely to symbolize those activities . . . 
which courts will deem to be sufficient to 
satisfy the demands of due process. Parke-
Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn,26 N.Y.2d 
13, 256 N.E.2d 506, 508 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1970) 
A contract entered, into by phone alone may be 
sufficient to vest jurisdiction: 
-12-
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Again it must be emphasized that no parti-
cular type of physical contact is required 
as a jurisdictional prerequisite. A letter 
or a telephone call may, in a given situation, 
be as indicative of substantial involvement 
with the forum state as a personal visit by 
the defendant or its agents. In-Flight Devices 
Corp. v. Van Dusen Air Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 235 
(6th Cir. 1972) ~ ~ 
A similar conclusion was reached in State ex rel White 
Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121, 448 
P.2d 571 (1968). There a contract was entered into 
by phone and later confirmed in writing by mail. The 
court in that case found jurisdiction to lie despite 
the fact that defendant had not physically been present 
in the forum: 
The pending litigation clearly lies: in the 
wake of the order which /defendant/ placed 
with /plaintiff^7. Whether or not "title 
passed," the telephone order produced 
substantial business consequences in /The 
foruny7. Written confirmation merely re-
enforced the order. Physical presence 
within the forum is not necessary to the 
existence of a tort within the state . . . . 
On the score of physical presence there is 
no substantial reason for distinguishing 
business transactions from personal injuries. 
448 P.2d 573. 
Further responding to defendant's contention that 
recognizing jurisdiction on such a tenuous basis as a 
contract entered into over the phone, would violate 
due process, the court concluded to the contrary that 
recognizing jurisdiction would not violate constitu-
tional standards: 
-13-
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Unfairness inconsistent with notions of fair 
play occurs only when a defendant is "compelled 
to defend himself in a court of a State with 
which he has no relevant connection." 
In the case at bar, both parties are . . . 
engaged in interstate commerce. Both parties 
used conventional and well-understood methods 
of communicating offers and acceptances . . . • 
It is clear that the placing of the telephoned 
order had effects, or "significant contacts," 
in /the forum/. 448 P.2d at 574 (quoting 
Judge FriendTy). 
To the same effect is Griffiths & Sprague Stevedoring Go. 
v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., 430 P.2d 600 (Wash. 1967). 
There the court recognized jurisdiction on the basis of 
a single phone call by the nonresident to the forum, 
despite the fact that the contract was ultimately exe-
cuted abroad: 
The connecting link then may consist of 
affirmative acts taking place here by 
which the out-of-state resident overtly 
submits to jurisdiction (Quigley v. Spano 
Crane Sale & Serv., Inc., 70 Wash Dec. 2d 
193, 422 P.2d 512 (1967))7 or the initia-
tion of a transaction outside the state in 
contemplation that some phase of it will 
take place in the forum state (Nixon v. 
Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963)). . . . 
The existence of these phenomena of modern 
economy are ordinarily enough to bring the 
parties within the long-arm statute without 
engendering an unjust or oppressive exten-
sion of jurisdiction. 422 P.2d at 603. 
The court further commented: 
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When /defendant/7 ordered insurance by 
telephone and mail from or through 
/plaintiff/ it overtly performed acts 
making it a party to and participant 
in a business transaction in /the 
forum/, even though it was contem-
plated by /defendant/ that the insurer 
might be a foreign agency. 422 P.2d 
at 604. 
These cases then can be distinguished from the 
typical "mail order" situation, where the buyer is 
relatively a passive party who simply places an order 
in response to the initiatory efforts of the seller. 
In cases involving commercial dealings, the nonresidents 
are generally not "'passive purchasers1 being unsuspect-
ingly and unfairly dragged into a foreign forum." M & W 
Contractors Inc v. Arch Mineral Corporation, 466 F.2d 
1339, 1340 (6th Cir. 1972); See also In-Flight Devices 
Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., supra. The theory of these 
cases then is that physical presence, although signifi-
cant, is not the primary determinant in considering jur-
isdiction. The focus should instead be on whether or 
not the nonresident so purposefully acted as to know-
ingly cause consequences within the forum: 
That a defendant did not perform a 
physical act within the /forum7 is 
not determinative of his or her lack 
of "minimum contact," for activities 
outside the state resulting in conse-
quences within the state may subject 
those involved in such activities to 
in personam jurisdiction of the courts 
of the state. Hamilton Nat'l Bank of 
Chattanooga v. Russell, 261 F. Supp 145 (1966). 
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The contact-producing activity within 
this state made by a nonresident has 
to be neither extensive nor physical, 
so long as the suit arises from at 
least some of those and the impact 
in this state of the nonresident's 
activity is foreseeable. Int'l Sales 
and Lease v. Seven Bar Flying Service, 
Inc., Wash. App. , 533 
P.2d 445 (1975). 
Thus, a single phone call or contact by 
mail may be sufficient to constitutionally establish 
jurisdiction where either is intended to cause signi-
ficant consequences within the forum state: 
Although defendant's only contact 
within this state was a telephone 
call, that call was all that was 
necessary for defendant to achieve 
its purpose. Cook Ass'n Inc. v. 
Colonial Broach & Machinery Co., 
14 111. App.3d 965, 304 N.E.2d 27 
(1973). 
A letter or a telephone call may, in 
a given situation, be as indicative 
of substantial involvement with the 
forum state as a personal visit by 
the defendant or its agents. In-Flight 
Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 
644 F.2d 220, 235 (6th Cir. 1972). 
And as with In-Flight Devices, supra, and Cook Ass'n, 
Inc., supra, defendant in this case was aware that 
its making of a contract with plaintiff would affect 
the forum state: "/t/hat the making (and breaking) 
of a contract with the Plaintiff would have substan-
tial consequence with the /forum7 is a reality of 
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which Defendant could not have been ignorant." 466 
F.2d at 227. In this sense, defendant's contacts by 
mail and phone in this case constitute the business 
equivalent of physical "presence," (Murphy v. Erwin-
Wasey, Inc., 460 F.2d 661 (1st Cir. 1972)) and recogniz-
ing jurisdiction under such circumstances is constitu-
tionally valid: 
For the purposes of ("general fairness"), 
business is transacted in a state when 
obligations created by the defendant or 
business operations set in motion by 
the defendant have a realistic impact 
on the commerce of that state . . . . 
Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, 
Inc., 401 F.2d at 382. 
2. Defendant's presence in this State in 
connection with its course of dealings with plaintiff 
is sufficient to vest jurisdiction. 
While it is clear that physical presence is 
not necessary for the court to vest jurisdiction, the 
undisputed facts in this case are that Jerry Whalen as 
President of Whalen and Company came to Utah and met 
with plaintiff's sales representatives at plaintiff's 
place of business in regard to their business dealings. 
Such presence by defendant's president for the purpose 
of discussing the possibility of further dealings between 
the parties, clearly is sufficient "physical presence" 
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to vest jurisdiction on that basis alone* In Delta 
Equities v. Larwin Mortgage Investors, 133 Ga. App. 
382, 211 S.E.2d 9 (1975)f for example, defendant made 
two visits to the state in connection with the negotia-
tion of a contract with plaintiff. The court, under 
those circumstances, upheld jurisdiction on the basis 
of those minimal contacts. 
/W7e are not unmindful that the trend 
of the opinions is to construe long-
arm "transacting any business" statutes 
most liberally and to uphold the juris-
diction of the court of the plaintiffs 
residence in actions, arising either 
directly or indirectly, out of such 
transactions. 211 S.E.2d at 11. 
Similarly, in Harry Winston, Inc. v. Waldfagel, 292 
F. Supp 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), two visits by defendant to 
a New York store in connection with contract negotiations 
was held sufficient to constitute "transacting any busi-
ness," even though the contract was executed over the 
phone and the subject matter of the contract was delivered 
by mail. To the same effect, see, Tatham-Laird & Kudner, 
Inc. v. Johnny's American Inn Inc., 383 F.Supp 28 (N.D. 
111. 1974); Doyn Aircraft, Inc. v. Wylie, 443 F.2d 579 
(10th Cir. 1971); Karlin v. Avis, 326 F.Supp 1325 
(E.D.N.Y. 1971); Hill v. Smith, 337 F.Supp. 981 (W.D. 
Mich. 1972). On that basis, this case is not unlike 
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Foreign Study League v. Holland-America Line, 27 Utah 2d 
442, 497 P.2d 244 (1972). There defendant had conducted 
business through sales promotion by "independent non-
exclusive sales representative," had corresponded by 
mail and telephone with the plaintiff in connection with 
such sales promotion and on two occasions its agents 
had combined "social and business" visits to Utah. The 
Utah Supreme Court held those contacts sufficient to 
vest jurisdiction. 
In addition to the actual presence of Jerry 
Whalen in the forum for the purpose of conducting business 
with plaintiff, defendant in each business transaction, 
purchased or leased the equipment from plaintiff FOB 
plaintiff's offices in Salt Lake City, Utah. Accordingly, 
defendant's agent was present in Utah in connection with 
each business transaction entered into between the 
parties for the purpose of "picking up" the equipment. 
The facts in the instant case with respect to defendant's 
"picking up" of the equipment purchased or leased from 
plaintiff are similar to those in Mcintosh v. Navaro Seed 
Company, 81 N.M. 302, 466 P.2d 868 (1970). Jurisdiction 
in Mcintosh was recognized on the basis of an "isolated 
transaction" where defendant purchased seed grain from 
plaintiff by telephone and later picked up the purchased 
grain at plaintiff's place of business. To the same 
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effect is Wickman v. Hughs, 248 Ark, 121, 450 S.W.2d 
294 (1970). There defendant purchased horses, leaving 
the seller with a check which later was returned for 
insufficient funds. The court held jurisdictional 
requirements of "transacting business11 were met by such 
acts. Similarly, in Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. 
Superior Court, 323 P.2d 437 (Cal. 1958), Justice 
Traynor upheld jurisdiction where the products pur-
chased by the nonresident defendant were sold FOB plain-
tiff's place of business in California. Justice Traynor 
there concluded that since title to goods was transferred 
in California, pursuant to the FOB arrangement, defendant 
was "doing business" in California. See also, Crusader 
Marine Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 281 F.Supp. 802 (E.D. 
Mich. 1968). 
In conclusion, the district court in the instant 
case improperly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdic-
tion on two basis. First, actual physical presence is 
not a constitutional prerequisite to recognizing juris-
diction where the nonresident defendant has made his 
commercial presence manifest within the forum through 
a course of business dealings by mail and phone. Second, 
defendant in this case has actually been present in this 
state and has transacted business within the state. 
Jerry Whalen met with plaintiff's sales personnel at 
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their offices in Salt Lake City on at least one occasion 
in 1973, and defendant's agent was present in the state 
in each instance where defendant purchased or leased 
equipment FOB from plaintiff, for the purpose of "picking 
up" the equipment. Thus defendant has purposefully 
transacted business within the state so as to fall with-
in the holding of the court in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 
U.S. 235, 253 (1958): 
It is essential in each case that there 
be some act by which the defendant 
purposefully avails itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within the 
forum state, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws. 
B. 
THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE INSTANT CASE 
AROSE OUT OF THE PURPOSEFUL BUSINESS 
ACTIVITIES ENTERED INTO BY DEFENDANT 
WITH PLAINTIFF. 
The cause of action in the instant case involves 
obligations created by the rental lease agreement between 
plaintiff and defendant. Whalen's participation in 
establishing those obligations and in setting in motion 
the lease of the Allis-Chalmers front-end loader is undis-
puted. The front loader was leased FOB plaintiff's yard 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, at defendant's initiation and 
delivered per defendant's instructions to J. Whalen as 
consignee in Billings, Montana. Furthermore, plaintiff 
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as a matter of normal business practice confirmed the 
lease transaction by mailing an invoice to defendant 
following defendant's ordering of the equipment. 
Nor was this a solitary transaction but instead 
arose out of a long term and continuous business re-
lationship between the parties. Defendant had trans-
acted similar lease agreements with plaintiff for 
heavy equipment on at least two previous occasions. 
Similarly, Jerry Whalen as president of Whalen and 
Company had made numerous sales transactions by phone 
with plaintiff involving miscellaneous mining and drill-
ing equipment over a period in excess of ten years, and 
involving many thousands of dollars. 
As has been previously discussed, most of these 
sales transactions were entered into by phone and con-
firmed by mail. Invoices were in each case mailed from 
Cate Equipment in Salt Lake City to Whalen & Company in 
Montana, and defendant normally paid for such purchases 
or leases by mailing checks to plaintiff's office in 
Salt Lake City. Furthermore, the course of dealing was 
initiated by defendant in an effort to serve its opera-
tive needs. In essence, the facts of this case are 
comparable to those in Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. 
Superior Court, 323 P.2d 437 (Cal. 1958). There defen-
dant purchased products from plaintiff over a two year 
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period. In concluding that such regular sales trans-
actions can render a foreign corporation amenable to 
the jurisdiction of the forum, Justice Traynor pointed 
out that the alleged cause of action grew directly out 
of defendant's continuous business relation with plain-
tiff, and as a result jurisdiction would properly lie 
in the forum. 323 P.2d at 437. 
The facts in this case distinguish it from 
those cases where the Utah Supreme Court has denied 
jurisdiction because the cause of action did not arise 
out of the defendant's activities within the state. In 
Mack Financial Corporation v. Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc., 
Utah 2d , 529 P.2d 429 (1974), for 
example, the defendant's activities within the state 
primarily involved defendant's use of the state high-
ways, whereas the cause of action involved a contractual 
obligation. Similarly, in Hanks v. Administrator of 
the Estate of Jensen, Utah 2d , 531 
P.2d 363 (1974), defendant's activities within the 
state involved defendant's administration of an estate 
within Utah, whereas his cause of action involved 
damages arising out of an automobile accident in Califor-
nia. These cases, as distinguished from the instant 
case, were properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 
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in that plaintiff's cause of action did not arise out 
of defendant's activities within the state. 
The instant case, in comparison, involves a 
cause of action arising out of defendant's purposeful 
business transactions within the State of Utah and 
meets the second criteria for constitutionally uphold-
ing jurisdiction. 
C 
•
;
 DEPENDANT'S ACTS AND THE RESULTING CONSE-
QUENCES CAUSED BY SUCH ACTS HAVE A SUB-
STANTIAL CONNECTION WITH THE FORUM STATE, 
SUCH THAT RECOGNIZING JURISDICTION WOULD 
BE REASONABLE AND FAIR. 
The final issue involved is whether the State 
of Utah has an interest in resolving the conflict at 
issue, and whether such interest is consistent with the 
requirements ,of due process. In this case the court is 
aided somewhat by the express declaration of Utahfs 
Legislature, that it is in the State's interest to afford 
resident plaintiffs effective redress against nonresi-
dents in any cause of action arising from any business 
transaction substantially affecting Utah residents. A 
commercial contract with a resident plaintiff clearly 
constitutes "transacting business within the state" and 
fairly provides the basis of jurisdiction: 
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Thus, where jurisdiction prior to enactment 
of the long-arm statute . . . formerly 
depended on doing business as a more or 
less continuous concept such as maintain-
ing offices, agents, and performing con-
tracts in the routine and regular course 
of business within the forum state or 
involved activities showing a continuing 
course of conduct, now a solitary business 
deal, if transacted within this state will, 
suffice to vest jurisdiction . . . ." 
Quigley v. Spano Sales and Service, 70 Wash 
Dec. 2d 193, 422 P.2d 512, 514 (Wash. 1967). 
It is, therefore, especially true in this case where 
the contract was not a "one-shot1* affair. The contract 
at issue was but an instance of a continuous business 
relation that existed between plaintiff and defendant, 
from which defendant profited. And as the court in 
Southern Machine Company, supra,suggested, n/l7t cannot 
complain if along with the profits from the /forum7 
market it must also accept the process from the /foruny7 
courts." 401 F.2d at 386. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that 
jurisdiction may be constitutionally recognized where a 
party has benefitted from activities affecting residents 
of the forum state: 
But to the extent that a corporation exercises 
the privilege of conducting activities with a 
state, it enjoys the benefits and protection 
of the laws of that state. The exercise of 
that privilege may give use to obligations; 
and, so far as those obligations arise out 
of or are connected with the activities 
within the state, a procedure which requires 
the corporation to respond to a suit brought 
to enforce them can, in most instances, 
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hardly be said to be undue. 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
The approach outlined in International Shoe, supra, was 
followed by Justice Traynor in Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. 
v. Superior Court, 1323 P.2d 437 (Cal. 1958). In that 
case, Justice Traynor held that where a nonresident 
seller had made regular purchases of goods FOB the 
resident-seller's place of business in California, 
defendant was constitutionally amenable to suit in Cali-
fornia: 
Whenever litigation arises out of business 
transactions conducted across state lines 
between parties whose physical places of 
business are in different states, there 
may be hardship to the party required to 
litigate away from home. There is no 
constitutional requirement, however, 
that this hardship must invariably be 
borne by the plaintiff whenever the defen-
dant is not deemed present in the state 
of plaintiff's residence. In some cir-
r cumstances there is adequate basis for 
jurisdiction when the defendant has 
elected to deal with the plaintiff even 
though by mail. McGee v. International 
Life Insurance Co., 78 S.Ct. 199, 201. 
323 P.2d at 440. 
And as with the transaction involved in Henry R. Jahn, 
supra, Whalen & Co. in the instant case leased the 
equipment FOB Salt Lake City, and, therefore, took 
title to the goods in this state. Accordingly, "/T7t 
reaped the benefits of our laws that protected its goods 
while they were here, and it had access to our courts 
to enforce any rights in regard to these transactions." 
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The same reasoning was followed in State ex rel White 
Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121, 448 P.2d 
571 (1968): 
One who regularly engages in 
interstate business subjects himself 
to the possible inconvenience of liti-
gating in other states concerning the 
business there transacted. Anyone who 
either buys or sells nationally transacts 
business in the state of both the buyer 
and the seller. The fairness involved is 
really determined by the convenience of 
the litigants. If it is convenient to 
transact business it is not so inconven-
ient to litigate as to be unfair. 448 
P.2d at 574 (Holman, J. concurring). 
The Utah Supreme Court also has followed the 
reasoning of International Shoe, Inc., supra, and McGee, 
supra. In upholding jurisdiction on the basis of the 
"long-arm" statutes, the Utah Supreme Court in Hill v. 
Zale, 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P.2d 332 (1971) stated: 
when a formed corporation is permitted 
to enjoy the advantages of having activi-
ties carried on within a state to further 
its business interest under the protections 
of its laws, it is only fair and reasonable 
that its citizens have some practical means 
of redress if grievances arise. 
482 P.2d at 333, 334. 
The Court further suggested that while the nonresident 
defendant may be inconvenienced by having to defend the 
cause of action in this state, "the hardship or incon-
venience to a plaintiff should also be given considera-
tion. " 482 P.2d at 335. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant has transacted business within the 
forum state so as to be within the purview of Utah's 
Long-Arm Statute, § 78-27-24 U.C.A. (1969). The defen-
dant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of 
acting and causing consequence in the forum state* 
Furthermore, the cause of action involving a contractual 
claim arose out of defendant's purposeful activities 
with plaintiff within the forum. Consequently, recogniz-
ing jurisdiction under these facts is reasonable and does 
not offend traditional notions of fair play and justice* 
The court below, therefore, erred in granting 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/• (/,"-•-- / ^ v ^ ^ v 
R. COLLIN MANGRUM ^ 
CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER, 
JENSEN & EVANS 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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